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Background to this study 
The classic liberal position1 concerning obscene and pornographic material in 
England and Wales has been that it is lawful to possess it for private use, but not to 
distribute or sell it where it may harm others.2 These restrictions are supplemented by 
other statutory or common law criminal offences, such as displaying an indecent 
matter visible from a public place3 or outraging public decency.4 In addition, a plethora 
of legislation deals with the import and export of obscene material and restricts its 
dissemination through different media outlets.5 While these measures vary in terms of 
their standards and objectives, they all employ a strategy which targets the source or 
distributor of such material.6  
Indecent photographs of children represent in the legal system ‘a different class of 
threat,’7 because they inherently involve ‘an imbalance of power’8 between the child in 
the image and the adult who produced it. The law in England and Wales covers a wide 
range of offences, such as the taking, making or showing of indecent photographs of 
children.9 Moreover, pseudo-photographs10 are placed on the same footing as actual 
photographs.11 Whilst it may be argued that no real children are used in the production 
of pseudo-photographs, common arguments supporting their criminalisation suggest 
                                                 
1 L Edwards, J Rauhofer and M Yar, ‘Recent developments in UK cybercrime law’ in Y Jewkes and M 
Yar (eds), Handbook of Internet Crime (Willan Publishing, Devon: 2010) 417. 
2 Obscene Publications Act 1959 (OPA 1959). 
3 Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981. 
4 R v Gibson (1990) Cr App R 341. 
5 Customs Consolidations Act 1876, A Table of Prohibition and Restrictions Inwards; HM Customs and 
Excise, Volume C4: Import prohibitions and restrictions, Part 34: Indecent or obscene material, 
Appendix F; Broadcasting Act 1990, s 162 and Sch 15; Cinemas Act 1985, Sch 2, para 6; Video 
Recordings Act 1984, ss 2 and 4A; Communications Act 2003, s 3 and s 319. In addition, the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, Sch 3 gives local authorities the power to control 
‘sex establishments’ (meaning a sex cinema or a sex shop), including the power to exclude such 
businesses from certain areas.  
6 J Rowbottom, ‘Obscenity laws and the Internet: Targeting the supply and demand’ [2006] (Feb) Crim 
LR 97, 98. 
7 Edwards et al (n 1) 417. 
8 M Taylor and E Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime (Brunner-Routledge, Hove: 2003) 2. 
9 Protection of Children Act 1978 (PCA 1978), s 1. 
10 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 84(3)(c): Pseudo-photograph means an image, whether 
made by computer-graphics or otherwise howsoever, which appears to be a photograph. 
11 PCA 1978, s 7(8). 
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that they are ‘instrumental in nature,’12 as they may be used in the grooming process or 
employed to entice other children into the same conduct. Simply possessing any 
indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child is also illegal.13 This prohibition 
constitutes an exception to the aforementioned strategy of targeting the source or 
distributor of the material and was taken as the model for new measures which 
represent a different form of control over adult pornography. 
In 2005, the UK Government consulted the public on whether to criminalise the 
possession of ‘extreme’ pornographic imagery. The path to the legislative change 
began with Jane Longhurst’s death by ligature strangulation during sexual intercourse 
with Graham Coutts, a man whom she had known socially. Coutts had visited various 
pornographic websites one day before the victim’s death, including a website entitled 
‘death by asphyxia.’ The idea that consumption of pornography ‘fuelled’14 Coutts’ 
sexual desires and ensuing criminal act was later presented by the Jane Longhurst 
Trust as a powerful argument for legislating against extreme pornographic websites 
that promote violence against women.  
The Home Office consultation document stated that the proposals to strengthen the 
law were fostered by: (a) a desire to protect those who participate in the creation of 
sexual material containing violence, cruelty or degradation, who may be the victim of 
crime in the making of the material, whether or not they notionally or genuinely 
consent to take part; and (b) a desire to protect society, particularly children, from 
exposure to such material, to which access can no longer be reliably controlled through 
legislation dealing with publication and distribution, and which may encourage interest 
in violent or aberrant sexual activity.15 The first justification sees individual viewers as 
generating a demand which in turn increases the production of material that may cause 
harm to the individuals featured in it. The first part of the second justification seems 
odd. It has been argued that it is unclear how it supports the introduction of a 
possession offence, since it would allow the prosecution of many that are exposed to 
the material over the Internet.16 It was hoped, however, that by discouraging interest in 
the material at issue, production would discontinue and therefore, by breaking the 
cycle of demand and supply, the risk of members of society being exposed to it would 
be eliminated. The second part of the second justification raises the issue of whether 
such material creates harm by shaping individuals’ attitudes and interest in ‘aberrant’ 
sexual behaviour. 
The original proposals to outlaw possession of extreme pornography were intended 
to close ‘a gap in existing legislation’17 which developed by reason of technological 
                                                 
12 D Howitt and K Sheldon, Sex Offenders and the Internet (Wiley, Chichester: 2007) 78; Y Akdeniz, 
Internet Child Pornography and the Law: National and International Responses (Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd, Aldershot: 2008) 22. 
13 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 160. 
14 R v Coutts [2005] EWCA Crim 52, [94]. 
15 Home Office, Consultation: On the Possession of the Extreme Pornographic Material (Home Office 
Communications Directorate, London: 2005) [34]. 
16 Rowbottom (n 6) 101. 
17 Home Office, Consultation (n 15) [35]. 
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advancements capable of circumventing existing controls.18 The material targeted is 
already illegal to produce and distribute under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 
(OPA 1959) but is now easily accessible online. By criminalising possession, the 
offence is aimed at responding to the ineffectiveness of the existing legal framework in 
controlling certain categories of pornographic images, which are produced outside of, 
but procured by Internet users within England and Wales.19 
The Home Office asserted that they were not aware of any Western jurisdiction 
which prohibits simple possession of such imagery.20 Some Council of Europe 
member states criminalise certain forms of violent pornography. The German criminal 
code, for example, provides penalties for whoever ‘disseminates, displays publicly, 
presents, produces […] pornographic materials that have as their object acts of 
violence or sexual acts of persons with animals.’21 However, it is legal to possess such 
material in Germany. Moreover, in Malta it is prohibited to produce, distribute and 
possess material depicting sexual activities with animals, though there is no ban on 
possession or distribution of violent pornography.22 In Netherlands, specific legislation 
prohibits only the ‘production or distribution of bestiality pornography.’23 In Sweden, 
however, pornographic images involving animals are authorised, provided that no 
‘cruelty’24 to animals is caused, in the sense of ‘causing physical or psychological 
suffering.’25 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has repeatedly 
expressed its concern over the public’s increased accessibility – especially via the 
Internet - to extreme pornographic material and the negative impact of violent 
pornography on women’s dignity.26 The Assembly has also noted the great disparities 
between Council of Europe Member States in the regulation of pornography and the 
poor enforcement of existing laws on the production and distribution of violent 
                                                 
18 Home Office, Press Release (30 August 2006), ‘New Offence to Crack Down on Violent and 
Extreme Pornography’ <http://www.cjp.org.uk/news/archive/new-offence-to-crack-down-on-violent-
and-extreme-pornography-30-08-2006/> accessed 10 September 2013. 
19 In 2015, 3,494 reports of alleged ‘criminally obscene adult content’ were made to the Internet Watch 
Foundation (IWF), which works within the UK to minimise the availability of sexual abuse content 
online. Criminally obscene adult content is defined by the IWF as ‘images and videos that show extreme 
sexual activity that is criminal in the UK.’ According to the IWF, ‘almost all’ of these 3,494 reports 
were not hosted in the UK and therefore fell outside their remit. Interestingly, none of them were 
assessed by IWF analysts as criminally obscene and hosted in the UK. In 2014, only 9 out of 3,016 
reports of such content were assessed as criminally obscene and hosted in the UK; see Internet Watch 
Foundation, Annual Report 2015 (IWF, Cambridge: 2015) 16 and Internet Watch Foundation, Annual 
Report 2014 (IWF, Cambridge: 2015) 16. 
20 Home Office, Consultation (n 15) [55]. 
21 M Stuligrosz, Violent and extreme pornography, Doc 12719 (Council of Europe, Parliamentary 
Assembly, Strasbourg: 2011) [67]. 
22 ibid [68]. 
23 ibid [69]. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
26 Recommendation 1981 (2011); Assembly debate on 5 October 2011 (32nd and 33rd Sittings) (see 
Doc 12719, report of the Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men). 
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pornography. For this reason, it has recommended that Members States criminalise the 
possession of violent and extreme pornography (including for personal use).27 
The UK Parliament legislated in s 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
2008 (CJIA 2008) to create a criminal offence of possession of an ‘extreme 
pornographic image.’28 It came into force on 26 January 2009 and applies to England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.29 The CJIA 2008 defines an ‘extreme pornographic 
image’ as an image of such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been 
produced solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal,30 is ‘grossly offensive, 
disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character’31 and portrays ‘in an explicit and 
realistic way’32 any of the following: (a) an act which threatens a person’s life; (b) an 
act which results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person’s anus, breasts or 
genitals; (c) an act which involves sexual interference with a human corpse; or (d) a 
person performing an act of intercourse or oral sex with an animal, whether dead or 
alive; and a reasonable person looking at the image would think that any such person 
or animal was real.33 The offence was amended in 2015 to cover the possession of 
extreme images depicting rape and assault by penetration. More specifically, two 
additional categories of prohibited material were included, i.e. an image which 
portrays in an explicit and realistic way (e) an act which involves the non-consensual 
penetration of a person’s vagina, anus or mouth by another with the other person’s 
penis, and (f) an act which involves the non-consensual sexual penetration of a 
person’s vagina or anus by another with a part of the other person’s body or anything 
else.34 The changes to the offence took effect on 13 April 2015 and apply only to 
possession of material which occurred on or after this date. 
Disgust and the criminal law 
The criminalisation of extreme pornography raised the deeply contested questions 
of whether what could be seen as grossly offensive, disgusting and purportedly 
harmful practices enjoyed in private should be immune from prosecution. In the 
absence of conclusive empirical evidence on the potential links between extreme 
pornography and physical harm, we briefly reflect on whether the criminal law and the 
notion of disgust can be justifiably invoked to punish its private use. 
The issue of how far morality should influence the law was hotly debated between 
the leading English jurist Lord Devlin and Professor Hart, whose writings were central 
                                                 
27 Resolution 2001 (2014); Assembly debate on 24 June 2014 (22nd Sitting) (see Doc 13509, report of 
the Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media and Doc 13536, opinion of the Committee on 
Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development). 
28 CJIA 2008, s 63(1). 
29 Scotland introduced analogous but wider provisions in the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) 
Act 2010, s 42. Their main differences from the English and Welsh law are discussed in Chapter Five. 
30 CJIA 2008, s 63(2) and 63(3). 
31 CJIA 2008, s 63(6)(b). 
32 CJIA 2008, s 63(7). 
33 ibid.  
34 CJIA 2008, s 63(7A) inserted by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 37; the CJIA 2008 
extends to England, Wales and Northern Ireland but the amendments made to it by s 37 do not affect the 
law as it applies in Northern Ireland. 
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to the discussion triggered by the publication of the 1957 Wolfenden Report on 
prostitution and homosexuality. Central to the Report was the assumption that the 
purpose of criminal law is: 
[…] to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what is offensive 
and injurious and to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption 
of others, particularly those who are especially vulnerable because they are young, 
weak in body or mind, inexperienced, or in a state of special physical, official or 
economic dependence. […] The law [should not] intervene in the private lives of 
citizens or seek to enforce any particular pattern of behaviour, further than is 
necessary to carry out the [outlined] purposes.35 
The Wolfenden Report drew a line between criminal justice intervention and matters 
of private morality. In this way, it largely mirrored Mill’s principle that prevention of 
harm to others was the only legitimate reason for state regulation of any activity.36 So 
long as people do not harm others, they should be left to make their own choices. 
The validity of the distinction between public and private morality was opposed by 
Devlin, who believed that some common form of morality was essential to avoid 
society’s disintegration. He compared immorality to subversive activities, in the sense 
that it was something against which society was entitled to guard itself. This being the 
case, the law had a duty to uphold the established morality of society and eradicate any 
behaviour that fell beyond the boundaries of social tolerance.37 However, it was not 
enough to say that a majority disliked a practice. Punishment should be reserved for 
certain practices which generated ‘a real feeling of reprobation’38 among right-minded 
people, indicating that the limits of toleration have been reached. Devlin’s viewpoint 
found judicial support in later high-profile cases, where judges felt that they were 
justified in positioning themselves as moral arbiters. For example, in the Ladies’ 
Directory case,39 where the House of Lords upheld the defendant’s conviction of the 
archaic crime of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, Viscount Simonds defended the 
courts’ power ‘to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral welfare of 
the State.’40 
Influenced by Mill’s ideas, Hart challenged Devlin’s thesis. He argued that using 
the law to enforce moral values was unnecessary because there was little evidence that 
failure to enforce sexual morality has resulted in societies’ disintegration. Moreover, 
the fact that some members of a society offend against one aspect of a moral code does 
                                                 
35 Home Office, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Cmd 2471, 1987) 
9-10; the Report recommended that prostitution should be viewed as a matter of private morality (except 
when it causes public nuisance) and that homosexual acts between consenting adults in private should 
be removed from the control of criminal law. 
36 JS Mill, On Liberty (The Floating Press, Auckland: 2009 [1859]) 18. 
37 P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (OUP, Oxford: 1965) 13. 
38 ibid 17. 
39 Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220 (discussed in Chapter Two). 
40 ibid 267; see also Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435, where the defendants were prosecuted for having 
published in a magazine advertisements inviting readers to contact advertisers for homosexual purposes. 
The House of Lords held that the offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals could be committed by 
encouraging conduct which, though not in itself unlawful, might be calculated to result in such 
corruption; see in particular Knuller (n 40) 457 (Lord Reid). 
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not necessarily result in the rejection of all rules of the code by all its members, putting 
society’s entire structure at risk. In addition, Devlin’s argument rested on the unproved 
assumption that there exists a unanimous agreement in our society on matters 
concerning moral values; established morality may well be accepted in practice only 
by a minority of citizens.41 Hart also strongly opposed Devlin’s criterion for discerning 
what constitutes an immoral act, i.e. the disgust it produces in the mind of the ordinary 
right-thinking persons - even by its very existence - and doubted that populist views 
could always be correct. The exercise of individual liberty requires a recognition of the 
principle that individuals may act freely even if others feel disgusted when they 
become aware of what it is they do - unless there are good reasons for prohibiting it.42 
The ‘major modern reformulation’43 of the harm principle is that of Feinberg. 
Feinberg’s harm principle differs from Mill’s in that harm or injury is not the only 
reason for justifying criminalisation. In addition, he states, ‘it is always a good reason 
in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would probably be an effective 
way of preventing serious offense […] to persons other than the actor, and that it is 
probably a necessary means to that end.’44 The prevention of offensive conduct, 
according to this principle, ‘is properly the state’s business’45 and restrictions may be 
sought because of the offensiveness caused to others by the display of obscene 
material in public. A legislator or judge should balance the seriousness of the offence 
caused against the reasonableness of the offender’s conduct.46 With reference to 
pornography Feinberg states: 
In the absence of convincing evidence of its causal tie to social harm, pornography 
ought to be prohibited by law only when it is obscene and then precisely because it is 
obscene. But obscene (extreme offensiveness) is only a necessary condition, not a 
sufficient condition, for rightful prohibition. In addition, the offending conduct must 
not be reasonably avoidable, and the risk of offence must not have been voluntarily 
assumed by the beholders.47   
Offence is more profound in relation to disgusting or extremely violent pornographic 
content. However, following Feinberg, if the material triggering a reaction of disgust is 
reasonably avoidable or the risk of offence has been willingly undertaken, either 
because of curiosity or through the anticipation of pleasure, then extreme offensiveness 
or disgust is not a sufficient reason for its prohibition.48 As far as extreme pornography 
is concerned, it is contended that such material is not widely advertised and one has to 
‘go and find it.’49 It is also argued that extreme pornography viewers access it 
                                                 
41 PJ Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1962) 78-81. 
42 LA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (OUP, Oxford: 1963). 
43 W Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2002) 20. 
44 J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Offense to Others (OUP, Oxford: 1985) 1. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid 26. 
47 Feinberg (n 44) 26, 142; see also DJ Baker, The Right Not to Be Criminalised: Demarcating 
Criminal Law’s Authority (Ashgate Publishing, Surrey: 2011) 199. 
48 Feinberg (n 44) 142. 
49 Backlash, ‘Extreme Pornography proposals: Ill-conceived and wrong’ in C McGlynn, E Rackley and 
N Westmarland (eds), Positions on the Politics of Porn: A debate on government plans to criminalise 
the possession of extreme pornography (Durham University, Durham: 2007) 11; Backlash was created 
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‘privately and by choice.’50 This being the case, the risk of offence is voluntarily taken. 
Therefore, s 63 fails to be justified by Feinberg’s analysis.51  
Arguments in favour of immunity from legal control are often defended on free 
speech grounds,52 but more radical claims go beyond the limits of freedom of 
expression in support of a right to obtain and read pornography. Ronald Dworkin 
argues that suppression of pornography interferes with an individual’s right to make 
their own moral decisions and determine their own sexual lifestyle.53 He defends the 
right of an individual to access pornography by arguing in favour of ‘a right to moral 
independence’54 whereby consenting adults can determine their own moral priorities. 
The right to moral independence is violated when the only plausible ground for 
regulating pornography is the hypothesis that the attitudes about sex portrayed or 
nurtured in pornography are ‘demeaning or bestial or otherwise unsuitable to human 
beings of the best sort,’55 even if this was true. Dworkin believed that governments 
should treat their subjects with equal concern and respect.56 By treating one citizen’s 
conception of a noble lifestyle more favourably than another’s, the government treats 
citizens with unequal respect and denies those who have uncongenial tastes an equal 
chance to shape the moral environment.57 Dworkin also argues that taste does not 
provide an adequate basis for interfering with individuals’ freedom.58 He accepts the 
role of morality in controlling pornography, but criticises the use of disgust as an 
insufficient condition to restrain individual freedom, because feelings such as disgust 
do not often represent a well-reasoned moral stand, but rather an expression of 
prejudice, misunderstanding and personal revulsion.59  
Nussbaum takes a strong line against disgust as well, arguing that it should ‘never’60 
be the primary basis for making an act criminal. The author admits feelings as a basis 
upon which the law may act to enforce morality, but proposes that indignation is more 
relevant to law, for it is better correlated with damage and is ‘typically based on 
ordinary causal thinking about who caused the harm that occurred, and ordinary 
                                                                                                                                             
in 2005 by the Libertarian Alliance, the Spanner Trust, the Sexual Freedom Coalition, Feminists against 
Censorship, Ofwatch and Unfettered to collate evidence for an informed debate on censorship and ‘fight 
plans to criminalise ownership of material the Home Office finds abhorrent’; McGlynn et al, Positions 
on the Politics of Porn (n 49) 9 fn 3. 
50 E Wilkinson, ‘Perverting Visual Pleasure: Representing Sadomasochism’ (2009) 12(2) Sexualities 
181, 193. 
51 See also D Pereira, ‘Pleasure Politicised: The Relevance of Morality in the Regulation of Extreme 
Pornography’ (2011) Bristol Law Journal 102, 111. 
52 N Strossen, Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex and the Fight for Women’s Rights (New York 
University Press, New York: 2000) 20-1. 
53 R Dworkin, ‘Is there a right to pornography?’ (1981) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 177, 194. 
54 ibid. 
55 R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1985) 354. 
56 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1977) 327. 
57 R Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (OUP, Oxford: 1996) 
238; for a criticism of this position, see J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, Oxford: 1986). 
58 Dworkin (n 57) 258. 
59 R Dworkin, ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals’ in R Wasserstrom (ed), Morality and the 
Law (Wadsworth, Belmont, CA: 1971) 72. 
60 MC Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton University Press, 
Oxfordshire: 2004) 14.  
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evaluation about how serious a harm this is.’61 Disgust, however, embodies ‘magical 
ideas of contamination and impossible aspirations to purity,’62 making it an 
untrustworthy guide to public policy. Nussbaum prompts us to be indignant about 
representations of sexual violence that may pose a risk to society’s moral values. 
Appealing to the emotion of disgust tends to cloud the issue. 
Beyond offensiveness? 
Debates about the legal control of pornography also emphasise the tension between 
liberal ideas of sexual expression and feminist concerns about women’s 
objectification.63  The 1979 Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film 
Censorship (the Williams Committee)64 endorsed the liberal principle that prohibition 
of pornography could only be justified if it could be shown to cause specific harm. If 
pornography was seen, as the Committee saw it, as a problem of offensiveness, this 
could be dealt with by the deployment of the distinction between private and public 
displays. Material that might shock reasonable people because of the manner it 
portrays sexual activities should only be available through restricted outlets. Many 
commentators, however, approach the issue of pornography differently now.  
Two major arguments have been advanced. The first seeks to lessen the power of 
the liberal conception of free pornographic expression by shifting attention from those 
who access pornography to women appearing in it and its impact on women’s image 
more generally. It suggests that, to the extent that pornography reinforces a hostile 
environment which makes women reluctant to speak, the absence of legal control 
affords more protection to pornographers’ speech, thereby undermining the influence 
and authority of women’s speech and, by extension, their ability to participate in 
public realms as equal citizens. The second argument proposes that pornographic 
representations contribute not only to women’s subordination but also violence against 
them. Some American feminists have argued that the law should enable women to seek 
civil remedies against producers of pornography on the grounds that it is a systematic 
practice of sexual discrimination that violates women’s right to equality.65 The idea of 
pornography as harmful sex discrimination against women is enshrined to some extent 
in the Canadian law as well.66 
                                                 
61 ibid 102.  
62 ibid 14.  
63 See MC Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (OUP, Oxford: 2000) 213-15 who suggests reconsidering 
the concept of objectification. 
64 The Committee was chaired by Bernard Williams. The Report was commissioned by a Labour 
Government and was considered ‘unacceptably liberal’ by the incoming Tories; J Petley, Film and 
Video Censorship in Modern Britain (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh: 2011) 131. Its 
recommendations were only partially implemented in the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981, the 
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 and the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 
1982.  
65 C MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA: 1988) 140, 148, 156, 175-77, 200-1. 
66 G Robertson, Freedom, the Individual and the Law (7th ed, Penguin, London: 1993) 233-4; R v 
Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452. 
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Other scholars have gone as far as suggesting that the consumption of pornography 
induces in some men a sexual desire for rape,67 but this argument sees human 
behaviour as being wholly determined by images that individuals consume. It also fails 
to account for the ‘catharsis model’ of the relation of pornography to behaviour, 
according to which pornography may help release sexual and/or aggressive tendencies 
and reduce sexual crimes.68 Finally, the difficult terrain of pornography has given rise 
to controversy even among feminists. The argument in favour of its legal control has 
been criticised for exaggerating the power of pornography and for replicating sex and 
gender stereotypes which the feminism approach so firmly opposes.69 
Previous research into s 63 of the CJIA 2008: a brief summary 
The production, availability and consumption of pornography have been discussed 
by a number of authors in recent years. Despite much excellent work on the law 
concerning indecent images of children,70 the legal control of extreme pornographic 
representations in England & Wales has not yet been fully explored. 
McGlynn argues that feminist voices were barely heard in public and policy debates 
about the adoption of the extreme pornography measures.71 McGlynn and Rackley 
criticised the 2008 legislative product as a weak version of the original proposals. The 
authors argue that ‘the government’s agenda should be focused solely on tackling harm 
and violence against women, rather than a moral crusade against material that is 
“aberrant” or simply explicit.’72 They ground their definition of extreme pornography 
on the ‘cultural harms’73 that pornography causes to society. Their concern is for 
images which ‘normalise, even glorify sexual violence through, for example, the 
deliberate, misogynistic valorisation of rape.’74  
Carline suggests that the real driving force behind the legal provisions is a ‘desire to 
promote a moralistic agenda’75 concerning appropriate expressions of sexuality. Leigh 
evaluates several ‘questionable aspects’76 of the offence and raises concerns over the 
practicalities of the enforcement of the legislation. Murray’s broadly liberal analysis 
                                                 
67 DEH Russell, Dangerous Relationships: Pornography, Misogyny and Rape (Sage, London: 1998) 
155. 
68 D Linz and N Malamuth, Pornography (Sage, Newbury Park, CA: 1993) 28-49. 
69 D Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment (Routledge, 
London: 1995) 95, 99. 
70 P Jenkins, Child Pornography on the Internet (New York University Press, New York/London: 
2001); T Taylor and E Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime (Brunner-Routledge, Hove: 
2003); Akdeniz (n 12); A Gillespie, Child Pornography: Law and Policy (Routledge, Oxon: 2011). 
71 C McGlynn, ‘Marginalizing feminism? Debating extreme pornography laws in public and policy 
discourse’ in K Boyle (ed), Everyday Pornography (Routledge 2010) 190-202. 
72 C McGlynn and E Rackley, ‘Striking a balance: Arguments for the criminal regulation of extreme 
pornography’ (2007) (Sep) Crim LR 677, 688. 
73 C McGlynn and E Rackley, ‘Criminalising extreme pornography: a lost opportunity’ (2009) 4 Crim 
LR 245, 259. 
74 ibid 249. 
75 A Carline, ‘Criminal justice, extreme pornography and prostitution: Protecting women or protecting 
morality?’ (2011) 14(3) Sexualities 312, 330. 
76 LH Leigh, ‘Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008: Extreme Pornography’ (2008) 172(46) JPN 
752, 755. 
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includes a demand for evidence of physical harm associated with pornography, and 
puts a high premium on participants’ consent and their right to privacy.77 From a 
human rights perspective, the new provisions attracted criticism from Foster for failing 
to impose necessary and proportionate restrictions on free speech and the right to 
access extreme images in private.78 Attwood and Smith argue that opposing the 
offence is not simply a matter of protecting personal sexual freedoms or refusing to 
acknowledge the existence of harms. They prompt academics to question ‘the very 
parameters on which the impulses to legislate in this way are based.’79 
McGlynn and Ward support the prohibition and seek to present in their work a 
‘pragmatic liberal humanist critique’80 of the regulation of pornography. They contend 
that opponents of the prohibition are severely affected by a ‘liberal fundamentalism’81 
preoccupied with individual rights at the expense of women’s equality. Moreover, 
Easton defends the offence on ‘perfectionist’82 grounds, insofar as it is used to uphold 
the value of ‘the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment and the promotion of 
human flourishing.’83  
Attwood et al’s collection of case studies in Controversial Images: Media 
Representations on the Edge offers ‘alternatives to reactionary notions of “media 
effects”’ and suggests ways through which we might gain a ‘more subtle’ appreciation 
of recent media controversies.84 In particular, Kennedy’s and Smith’s contribution, 
which relates to YouTube reaction videos,85 explores the meaning and the shock horror 
qualities of a two-and half minute video montage which became the subject of an 
attempted prosecution. Focusing on audience reaction videos and commentaries on 
these, the authors analyse the ways in which people react to and consume extreme 
and/or controversial images, arguing that their responses are more complicated than 
the ones often assumed by common-sense views and the law.  
The existing literature predominantly derives from recent official discourses 
concerning extreme pornography. It focuses on how the law on this particular topic 
should be and what may be viewed as justifiable prohibitions against such material. 
However, very little research has been conducted on the way in which s 63 has been 
used in practice by prosecutors, including Easton’s evaluation of the impact of the 
offence with reference to ten media reports published between June 2009 and July 
                                                 
77 AD Murray, ‘The reclassification of extreme pornographic images’ (2009) 72(1) MLR 73. 
78 S Foster, ‘Possession of extreme pornographic images, public protection and human rights’ (2010) 
15(1) Coventry Law Journal 21, 27. 
79 F Attwood and C Smith, ‘Extreme Concern: Regulating “Dangerous Pictures” in the United 
Kingdom (2010) 37(1) Journal of Law and Society 171, 188. 
80 C McGlynn and I Ward, ‘Pornography, Pragmatism, and Proscription’ (2009) 36(3) Journal of Law 
and Society 327.   
81 ibid 335.   
82 S Easton, ‘Criminalising the possession of extreme pornography: sword or shield’ (2011) 75(5) 
Journal of Criminal Law 391, 397. 
83 ibid 413. 
84 F Attwood, V Campbell, IQ Hunter & S Lockyer (eds), Controversial Images: Media 
Representations on the Edge (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire: 2013). 
85 J Kennedy and C Smith, ‘His Soul Shatters at About 0:23: Spankwire, Self-Scaring and Hyperbolic 
Shock’ in Attwood et al (n 84) ch 14. 
The Rise of Extreme Porn  
Palgrave Macmillan 2017 
Chapter One 
AK Antoniou & D Akrivos 2016   11 
 
201186 as well as McGlynn and Rackley’s examination of Simon Walsh’s 2012 trial,87 
in which the defendant was acquitted of five counts of possessing extreme 
pornographic images portraying anal fisting and ‘urethral sounding.’88 Without an 
understanding of the practical operation of the extreme pornography offence we are 
left with a limited analysis which does not provide a strong basis for well-informed 
policy decisions. This study aims to remedy this gap in the existing literature by 
examining the s 63 offence from a prosecutorial and criminological perspective in 
order to more fully elucidate the law and its implementation in a highly controversial 
area. 
The aims of this study 
Throughout this book, a number of focuses are used to scrutinise the legal position 
with respect to extreme pornography in England and Wales. The first focus relates to 
the relevant developments in the legal field of obscenity and indecent images of 
children, both in terms of legislation and judicial reasoning. The object of this analysis 
is two-fold: first, to gain a deeper understanding of the interpretation of the s 63 
offence, given that the proposals to outlaw possession of extreme pornographic images 
(EPI) ‘mirror the arrangements already in place in respect of indecent photographs and 
pseudo-photographs of children;’89 and second, to help map the terrain of the extreme 
pornography law, since the provisions governing EPI are not limited to ss 63-8 of the 
CJIA 2008. 
The then Government favoured retaining the OPA and creating a free-standing 
offence of possession. Consequently, individuals publishing or distributing extreme 
pornographic material within the UK may be charged with an offence contrary to 
the 1959 Act,90 but they may also be prosecuted under the new offence since they 
would necessarily also possess it.91 Therefore, some of the principles distilled from the 
obscenity law are applicable to the dissemination of EPI (Figure 1.1). Extreme images 
portraying children are dealt with under the legislation targeting child sexual abuse 
images. Where a suspect is found to be in possession of an EPI of a child, prosecutors 
should select charges for an offence of possession contrary to s 160 of the Criminal 
                                                 
86 Easton (n 82) 412; the author asserted in her 2011 article that the ‘fears of numerous over-zealous 
prosecutions [were] misplaced.’ 
87 R v Walsh (Kingston Crown Court, 8 August 2012, unreported). The authors draw on public tweets 
and press reports, but simultaneously acknowledge that these sources of information should be treated 
with great caution. They conclude that the law on extreme pornography is ‘misunderstood’ and in 
Walsh’s case ‘misused’; see E Rackley and C McGlynn, ‘Prosecuting the possession of extreme 
pornography: a misunderstood and mis-used law’ (2013) 5 Crim LR 400, 400. 
88 T Judd, ‘Extreme porn acquittal puts prosecutors in the dock’ The Independent (London 10 August 
2012) 16; N Cohen, ‘Simon Walsh: The vindictive persecution of an innocent man’ The Observer 
(London 12 August 2012) 35: in a sexual context, ‘urethral sounding’ involves ‘the insertion of surgical 
rods into the penis.’ Urethral sounds are ‘slightly conical instruments for exploring and dilating a 
constricted urethra’; KL Moore, AF Dalley and AMR Agur, Clinically Oriented Anatomy (7th ed, 
Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Philadelphia, PA: 2013) 425. 
89 Home Office, Consultation (n 15) [1].  
90 Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) Prosecution Policy and Guidance, Extreme Pornography 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/extreme_pornography/> accessed 7 June 2013. 
91 Home Office, Consultation (n 15) [49]. 
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Justice Act 1988 or making such an image contrary to s 1 of the Protection of Children 
Act 1978 (Figure 1.1).92 For a comprehensive analysis of the law on indecent images 
of children, interested readers are referred to the excellent work of Jenkins, Taylor and 
Quayle, Akdeniz and Gillespie.93 Relevant legal provisions will be discussed in this 
book only to the extent that they help explain the extreme pornography provisions. 
Figure 1.1 The general obscenity framework and specific legislation94  
The second focus is the criminalisation of extreme pornography. This books 
examines the origins of the offence, its legislative development and the ambitions 
underpinning Parliament’s adoption of the new measures. In addition, it explores the 
substance and scope of the offence in order to identify potential weaknesses and 
propose amendments. Key literature on the legal control of EPI is also considered with 
a view to determining whether it has influenced the law. Moreover, this study aims to 
measure the impact of the offence by exploring how many offences have been 
prosecuted since the law came into force and how offenders have been dealt with.  
A media criminological perspective is adopted as a third focus with a view to 
offering an insight into the crucial role of news media in the construction of extreme 
pornography as a social problem. The media analysis aims to complement its legal 
counter-part and thereby contextualise the subject matter. To this end, the British 
national press’ reaction to Jane Longhurst’s murder is closely examined. More 
specifically, the study assesses the value of Graham Coutts’ case as a media product 
and documents the key arguments expressed in the relevant claims-making process. It 
                                                 
92 CPS Prosecution Policy and Guidance, Extreme Pornography (n 90). 
93 Jenkins (n 70); Taylor and Quayle (n 70), Akdeniz (n 12) and Gillespie (n 70); see also T Buck, 
International Child Law (2nd ed, Routledge, Oxon: 2011). 
94 The provisions contained in the Protection of Children Act 1978 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
tackle indecent rather than obscene material. The legislation does not define the term ‘indecent.’ Judicial 
guidance is provided in R v Stamford (1972) 56 Cr App R 398, where the Court of Appeal dismissed an 
appeal against conviction of five offences of sending an indecent article by post. Ashworth J held that 
obscenity and indecency were ‘different steps on the scale of impropriety,’ with obscenity being ‘the 
graver of the two.’ The 1978 and 1988 Acts apply only to photographs or pseudo-photographs, as well 
as tracings or derivatives of photographs or pseudo-photographs; CJIA 2008, s 69(3). Different kinds of 
material, like sound, text or drawings are covered by the general provisions under the OPA 1959. The 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which introduced a new offence of possession of ‘prohibited’ images of 
children, criminalises the simple possession of certain categories of cartoons, drawings and virtual child 
sexual abuse images, whereas their publication or distribution is dealt with under the 1959 Act. 
Obscene Publications Act 1959 (as amended by the Obscene Publications Act 1964)
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, ss 63-8
Legislation targeting child sexual abuse images
Protection of Children Act 1988,
s 160
Criminal Justice Act 1988,
s 160
Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
ss 62-8
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also looks at the process through which the consequent ‘trial by media’ presented this 
exceptional case as the ‘tip of the iceberg’ and eventually translated into policy. The 
analysis sheds light on the attempts to ‘piggyback’ the issue of extreme pornography 
on child pornography and the textual and visual mechanisms used to establish an ‘us 
versus them’ dichotomy in the pertinent media discourse. The severity of the actual 
risk posed by extreme pornography and the extent to which its criminalisation could be 
regarded as the result of a mere moral panic is also discussed.  
The fourth and final focus considers the practical operation of the extreme 
pornography provisions. Questions regarding the types of material at which the 
enforcement of s 63 is directed, together with concerns over the sharp increase in the 
number of prosecutions in the second year of its implementation,95 led to the empirical 
part of this study. This seeks to address the lack of comprehensive research into the 
manner in which prosecutors have used the relevant legislative provisions by 
reviewing a sample of CPS case files involving s 63 offences. The examination of the 
case files focuses on the practical application of the law as reflected in prosecutors’ 
decision-making process. An additional line of enquiry explores the thresholds of 
extreme pornography that emerged, where prosecutors in the sample studied were 
satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction. 
The original proposals, outlined in the 2005 consultation document, were strongly 
questioned, even by those who were generally supportive, due to their vagueness and 
the potential breadth of the provisions.96 In particular, concerns were expressed over 
the categories of images proposed to be covered, including ‘realistic’ depictions of 
‘serious sexual violence’ and ‘serious violence in a sexual context.’97 These were 
considered by many participants in the consultation ‘too broad and likely to catch too 
much material.’98 In response to those concerns, the ‘grossly offensive, disgusting or 
otherwise of an obscene character’99 test was added to s 63 when the Criminal Justice 
and Immigration Bill went through its parliamentary stages. The practical effect of this 
standard, when taken in conjunction with the remaining elements of the offence, would 
be to ensure that s 63 only covers material which would be caught by the 1959 OPA, 
were it to be published in the UK.100  
It is the combination of all elements of the offence that distinguishes an extreme 
image from an obscene image. For instance, according to the CPS guidance a 
pornographic image portraying ‘torture with instruments’ may be deemed obscene and 
                                                 
95 This claim is substantiated in Chapter Six. 
96 C McGlynn and E Rackley, ‘Striking a balance' (n 72) 680. 
97 As it will be discussed later, the Home Office initially proposed restricting the offence to explicit 
pornography containing actual scenes or realistic depictions of necrophilia, bestiality, ‘serious sexual 
violence’ and ‘serious violence in a sexual context’; Home Office, Consultation (n 15) [39]. 
98 Home Office, Consultation On the Possession of the Extreme Pornographic Material: Summary of 
Responses and Next Steps (Home Office Communications Directorate, London: 2006) 4. 
99 CJIA 2008, s 63(6)(b). 
100 Ministry of Justice Circular 2009/ 01, Possession of extreme pornographic images and increase in 
the maximum sentence for offences under the Obscene Publications Act 1959: Implementation of section 
63-67 and section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Criminal Law Policy Unit, 
London: 2009) [13]. 
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its publication or distribution may be charged under the OPA.101 Because of the 
‘grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character’ requirement, the 
same image may qualify as extreme, but only if the ‘torture’ is also depicted ‘in an 
explicit and realistic way’ and ‘threatens a person’s life.’102 Thus, although there may 
be an overlap between obscene and extreme images, the definition of the latter is 
narrower than that of the former. In other words, not all obscene material is necessarily 
extreme. Observance of this narrower standard when applying the s 63 provisions 
ensures that the boundaries between extreme and obscene images are delineated. 
The case files analysis aims to determine whether the prosecution practice reflected 
in the present sample is in line with the prosecution practice followed in relation to 
obscene publications, and whether the material targeted comes under the more limited 
category of extreme images. The examination of these issues draws upon a comparison 
between the types of extreme imagery that form the subject of charges in the present 
sample, and the categories of pornographic material that are ordinarily prosecuted 
under the OPA. This is aided by the long experience crystallized in the CPS legal 
guidance on obscenity,103 which is far more detailed than the guidance on extreme 
pornography currently available. The research findings may inform any future policy 
considerations into the need to revise the existing CPS legal guidance and enhance 
training in this area. 
An introduction to our research methods 
As the phenomenon of law itself comprises individuals, organisational settings, 
institutional contexts and the interactions among them, ‘fully understanding law 
demands research conducted using multiple approaches.’104 A part of this study 
employed doctrinal research to examine the wider legal framework applicable to the 
legal control of extreme imagery and determine the precise state of the pertinent law 
nowadays. A media research framework was also employed in order to contextualise 
the legal debates around the criminalisation of extreme pornography, but also highlight 
the increasing role of contemporary news media in shaping public perceptions of crime 
and justice.105 
This study drew on a qualitatively oriented content analysis of 251 news articles on 
Coutts’ case published in national British newspapers between April 2003 and April 
2016 and 16 case files involving s 63 offences from four CPS areas (London, South 
East, West Midlands and Wales).106 In analysing our empirical data, we adopted 
                                                 
101 CPS Prosecution Policy and Guidance, Obscene Publications 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/obscene_publications/#a05> accessed 7 June 2013. 
102 CJIA 2008, s 63(7)(a); or ‘results, or is likely to result, in serious injury to a person’s anus, breasts 
or genitals’ according to CJIA 2008, s 63(7)(b).  
103 CPS Prosecution Policy and Guidance, Obscene Publications (n 101). 
104 LB Nielsen, ‘The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical Legal Research’ in P Cane and 
H Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP, Oxford: 2010) 952.  
105 C Greer and E McLaughlin, ‘Trial by Media: Policing, the 24-7 News Mediasphere, and the Politics 
of Outrage’ (2011) 15(1) Theoretical Criminology 23. 
106 The specific criteria according to which the news articles and case files were identified as relevant 
to the study are discussed in Chapters Four and Seven respectively. 
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Altheide’s ‘ethnographic content analysis’ (ECA).107 Using Altheide’s ECA model as 
our primary research method, ensured a robust exploratory procedure. ECA refers to 
an integrated method of identifying, retrieving and analysing documents for their 
relevance, meaning and importance.108 The author’s model underlines the role of the 
investigator as actively participating in their document-based research, which thus 
becomes a form of ethnography. ECA involves a search for underlying meanings, 
patterns, processes and context, as opposed to mere numerical relationships between 
variables.109 It is based on a ‘constant discovery and constant comparison’110 of 
emergent themes, thereby providing the researcher with the advantage of flexibility 
and continuous interaction with key subjects distilled from the analysis of the 
documents. 
The collection of the news articles was enabled via the LexisNexis database. 
LexisNexis is an indispensable tool to media research, especially when this spans over 
a long period of time, like the current one, but also presents a main disadvantage when 
used for qualitative research: it only offers access to their text, while omitting any 
accompanying images. However, nowadays, journalists rely heavily on the use of 
visuals to construct powerful stories111 and for that reason it was deemed necessary to 
also study the printed versions of the collected articles available in the British 
Newspaper Library as well as those in the newspapers’ online archives.  
The case files review was facilitated by the CPS Strategy and Policy Directorate, 
following the successful submission of an external research request application form. 
Access to the files was provided after the CPS ensured that the appropriate level of 
security clearance was granted and that the research fulfilled the CPS data protection 
and ethical requirements. The agreed arrangement was for the files to be analysed at 
the CPS headquarters in London.112 The files were securely returned to the Research 
Manager after completion of the on-site enquiry.  
Chapter outline 
The remainder of this book is structured as follows. Chapter Two focuses on the 
basic legal framework of obscenity. It examines the contemporary application of the 
OPAs 1959 and 1964, the extent to which they are effective when applied online, and 
the prosecution practice concerning obscenity offences. Chapter Three takes the reader 
through the legislative history of the offence and provides an insight into the 
assumptions and interests underlying it. In particular, it provides a legal analysis of the 
high-profile case of the murder of Jane Longhurst by Graham Coutts which prompted 
the campaign to ban the possession of violent pornography. It then moves on to discuss 
                                                 
107 Sometimes also referred to as qualitative content analysis; DL Altheide, Qualitative Media 
Analysis, Qualitative Research Methods Series 38 (Sage, London: 1996). 
108 DL Altheide, ‘Ethnographic Content Analysis’ (1987) 10(1) Qualitative Sociology 65; ibid 2. 
109 Altheide, Qualitative Media Analysis (n 107). 
110 ibid 16. 
111 C Greer and E McLaughlin, ‘“Trial by Media”: Riots, Looting, Gangs and Mediatised Police 
Chiefs’ in J Peay and T Newburn (eds), Policing, Politics, Culture and Control: Essays in Honour of 
Robert Reiner (Hart Publishing, Oxford: 2012).  
112 Rose Court, 2 Southwark Bridge, London SE1 9H. 
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the 2005 consultation process and the passage of the 2007 Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Bill. Chapter Four explores the role of news media in the construction of 
the extreme pornography problem and explains how these paved the way for the 
introduction of s 63 through their coverage of Jane Longhurst’s murder. It examines 
the elements that made the story newsworthy as well as journalists’ attempts to operate 
alongside criminal justice institutions and administer their own extra-legal justice. 
Chapter Five provides a detailed examination of the extreme pornography offence. The 
analysis critically engages with legal scholarship regarding the criminalisation of this 
type of imagery and considers the way it has affected the development of the law in 
this area. Chapter Six analyses original data pertaining to the number of prosecutions 
initiated and convictions obtained under s 63 since the offence came into force. It also 
explores sentencing trends. Chapters Seven and Eight present the findings that 
emerged from the CPS case files review. Chapter Sever briefly presents the overall 
research design and goes on to provide the wider context in which the key findings 
from the review should be placed. Chapter Eight explores the thresholds of extreme 
pornography indicated by the nature of the material in cases where prosecutors were 
satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction. 
This chapter is divided into broader sections which mirror the classification of extreme 
images under s 63(7) of the 2008 CJIA, that is: (a) images portraying an act which 
threatens a person’s life; (b) images portraying an act which results (or is likely to 
result) in serious injury to a person’s anus, breasts or genitals; and (c) images 
portraying bestiality. No section dealing with the fourth category of images portraying 
necrophilia is included, as none of the research cases in the sample studied related to 
images portraying acts that involve sexual interference with a human corpse. This 
study does not examine extreme pornographic images depicting non-consensual sexual 
penetration either, as this category of prohibited material was introduced after the 
completion of the research at issue. Finally, Chapter Nine summarises the key 
outcomes of this study, considers the limitations associated with the adopted 
methodological approach, and provides an outlook for future research. 
